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FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-AUTH-CODE-IS-CLIENT-BOUND

NameVerifies that an authorisation code is binded to the client it was intended for
CategoryINFOSEC
Execution MethodAUTOMATED (FAPI BASELINE)
Description

This test involves a first client establishing authorisation codes for token claiming but then Client 1’s valid code being used via Client 2’s client assertion and certificatecredentials. The Holder should reject requests which include a valid authorisation code but were issued to separate clients.

Preconditions
    Steps

    Client 1 Initiation: These steps are conducted using the first Client registered to the Holder and occur using Client 1’s MTLS certificate.

    1. Retrieve Discovery Document and parse required endpoints
    2. Retrieve JWKS Key Set using jwksuri attribute
    3. Validate JWKS keys are valid JSON, contain the required fields and are correctly encoded using unpadded base64url
    4. Verify all JWKS keys contain kids.
    5. Verify all JWKS keys do not contain any private or symmetric keys.
    6. Verify all JWKS keys are of at least 2048 bit in length
    7. Verify JWKS contains at least one key with alg of PS256 or ES256.
    8. Create authorisation request with content of (roughly) similar to:
    9. {
      "aud": "https://localmachine:8103/local-conformance-holder",
      "scope": "openid profile bank:accounts.basic:read bank:accounts.detail:read",
      "claims": {
      "sharingduration": 7776000,
      "id_token": {
      "acr": {
      "value": "urn:cds.au:cdr:2",
      "essential": true
      }
      }
      },
      "iss": "4unxLnjKSMQCTRYU1X1Bed",
      "response_type": "code id_token",
      "redirect_uri": "https://localhost.emobix.co.uk:8443/test/a/wikkitgate/callback",
      "state": "LwI4CZHGDm",
      "exp": 1603332124,
      "nonce": "vVqWbuseiL",
      "client_id": "4unxLnjKSMQCTRYU1X1Bed"
      }
    10. Sign the authorisation request using PS256.
    11. Create a client assertion containing iss, sub, jti , iat, exp and aud
    12. Sign the client assertion using PS256
    13. Dispatch the authorisation request (9) using the client assertion (11) to the pushedauthorizationrequestendpoint specified within the discovery document
    14. Verify that the PAR endpoint returns HTTP Status 201 with a valid requesturi returned
    15. Verify that the content of the request uri meets entropy of at least 128-bits
    16. Initiate a browser initiation to the authorize endpoint specifying:
      • requesturi retrieved in (13)
      • clientid matching the iss of the authorisation request
      • redirecturi matching the authorisation request
      • scope specifying scopes matching the authorisation request
      • responsetype of code idtoken
    17. Proceed through authorisation flow within the browser
    18. Receive redirect request at the redirecturi specified and extract the fragment content and verify the following:
      • state is not present in the url query string (but is present in the fragment)
    19. Verify that the fragment contained in the redirect response contains only:
      • code
      • state
      • id token
    20. Verify that code is of sufficient length and has at least 128-bit entropy
    21. Decrypt idtoken using encryption key for client and verify signature
    22. Validate the idtoken by verifying iss, aud, exp, iat, authtime, acr, sub and nbf claims
    23. Verify nonce within decrypted idtoken matches nonce specified in (8)
    24. Verify acr returned matches the one request (normally urn:cds.au:cdr:2)
    25. Extract shash and chash from ID Token
    26. Verify chash is correctly validated against specified code
    27. Verify shash is correctly validated against specified state

    Client 2: Using the code established in (18) within Client 1, as Client 2:

    1. Create a client assertion for submission to the token endpoint
    2. Perform POST /token using generated client assertion from (27), granttype of authorizationcode, code retrieved in (18) and redirecturi specified in (15)
    3. The request should be rejected with Http Status 400 invalid_client
    Inputs
    Expected Results
      The Holder must not allow valid authorisation codes to be used on clients for which they were not issued against