Information Security
This subsection contains all tests related to the Information Security Profile
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| CDR-DISCOVERY-END-POINT-VERIFICATION | Discovery End Point Verification | This test ensures that the server's configurations (including scopes, response_types, grant_types etc) is containing the required value in the specification |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ATTEMPT-AUTHORISATION-CODE-REUSE | Verifies the authorisation code expires within a period of time | This test case combines two FAPI tests regarding the reuse of a previous authorisation code. The first test verifies that an authorisation code is not usable after 30 seconds while the second does the same test with a 1 second delay. The 30 second version will result in a failure while the 1 second version will produce a warning. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-CLIENT-ASSERTION-INVALID-AUD-FAIL | Verifies that client assertions which are not intended for the Holder are rejected | This test passes client assertion where 'aud' is wrong (is for a different server). The server must be rejected at the token endpoint and returning an error message that the 'aud' claim of the client assertion is invalid. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-CLIENT-ASSERTION-WITH-NO-SUB-FAILS | Verifies that client assertions include a sub claim | This test passes a client assertion where 'sub' is missing to the token endpoint. The server must reject this, returning an 'invalid_client' error. It is vital that the server requires the 'sub' claim, as this is the primary reason a signed request object cannot be used as a client authentication assertion. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-CLIENT-ID-IN-TOKEN-ENDPOINT | Ensures that the Holder verifies the Certificate used matches the Client ID | This test establishes consent for Client 1 and then attempts to use Client 2βs certificate to renew tokens. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-DISCOVERY-END-POINT-VERIFICATION | Discovery End Point Verification | This test ensures that the server's configurations (including scopes, response_types, grant_types etc) is containing the required value in the specification |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-AUTH-CODE-IS-CLIENT-BOUND | Verifies that an authorisation code is binded to the client it was intended for | This test involves a first client establishing authorisation codes for token claiming but then Client 1βs valid code being used via Client 2βs client assertion and certificatecredentials. The Holder should reject requests which include a valid authorisation code but were issued to separate clients. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-AUTHORISATION-MATCHES-CLIENT-PAR | Ensures the holder verifies that request objects are signed by the active client | This test verifies that request objects submitted to the PAR endpoint are suitably verified based on their cryptographic signature. If an invalid signature is detected the server should reject the request during PAR setup |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-AUTHORISATION-REQUEST-MISSING-REQUEST-FAILS | Ensures the holder rejects requests where a request object or request uri is not supplied | This test calls the authorization endpoint without using a request object (i.e. with all the parameters passed in the url query), and should end with the authorization server showing an error message that the request is invalid (a screenshot of which should be uploaded) or with the user being redirected back to the conformance suite with an invalid_request error. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-AUTHORIZATION-REQUEST-WITHOUT-STATE-SUCCESS | Verify Requests missing state are accepted | This test makes an authentication request that does not include 'state'. State is an optional parameter, so the authorization server must successfully authenticate and must not return state nor s_hash. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-CLEARTEXT-SIGNING-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder does not accept request objects which are not signed | This test verifies that request objects submitted to the PAR endpoint are not unsigned (ie. plain text json serialisations) and, if they are, the server rejects the request during PAR setup. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-DIFFERENT-NONCE | Verifies behaviour related to supplying a nonce on an endpoint different to a request | This test passes a different nonce in the authorization_endpoint parameters to the one inside the signed request object. The authorization server must either return an invalid_request error back to the client, and must show an error page (saying the request object is invalid as the 'nonce' value in the request object and outside it are different - upload a screenshot of the error page), or must successfully authenticate and return the nonce from inside the request object in the id_token. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-EXPIRED-CLIENT-ASSERTION-FAIL | Verifies that client assertions which are expired fail | This test passes client assertion where 'exp' is 5 minutes ago. The server must be rejected at the token endpoint and returning an error message that the expiration time ('exp') of the client assertion is invalid. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-EXPIRED-REQUEST-OBJECT-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder enforces request objects which are not expired | This test should end with the authorization server rejecting a PAR establishment when supplied a request object which is expired |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-INVALID-SIGNING-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder does not accept request objects which are not signed | This test verifies that request objects submitted to the PAR endpoint are suitably verified based on their cryptographic signature. If an invalid signature is detected the server should reject the request during PAR setup |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-MISSING-CLIENT-ASSERTION-FAILS | Verified that a client assertion is always supplied on the token endpoint | This test performs a normal authentication but when it calls the token endpoint to exchange the authorization code for tokens, it does not include a client authentication assertion. The token endpoint must return the error 'invalid_client' or 'invalid_request' as client authentication is mandatory at the token endpoint when using private_key_jwt client authentication. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-MTLS-HOK-REQUIRED | Verifies TLS version/cipher limitations and valid token endpoint error responses | This test does an iterative check on the TLS version/ciphers in use before attempting to POST /token and expecting that an OAuth2 error is returned |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-OTHER-SCOPE-ORDER-SUCCEEDS | Ensure a different scope ordering is still acceptable | This test makes a FAPI authorization request but with the order of the entries in the 'scope' reversed, which must succeed. As per RFC6749 section 3.3, 'If the value contains multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter'. The reason for this test is that some OAuth clients process scopes in a way that the order they are sent to the server is not under the control of a developer using that client, and as per the spec such requests must still be accepted. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REDIRECT-URI-INCLUDED-PAR | Ensure the holder enforces the requirement for the redirect uri to specified within the request object | This test omits the redirect uri from being specified and should end with the authorisation server rejecting the PAR request setup |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REGISTERED-REDIRECT-URI | Ensures the Holder is enforcing only registered Redirect URIs | This test uses an unregistered redirect uri. The authorization server should display an error saying the redirect uri is invalid, a screenshot of which should be uploaded. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITH-BAD-AUD-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holders does not allow requests it is not the audience for | This test verifies that a Holder does not accept request objects which, while cryptographically acceptable, include an aud audience value that is not their issuer. This case handles the situation where only invalid aud entries are provided versus FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITH-MULTIPLE-AUD-SUCCEEDS which should succeed if one of a multiple number of aud are matching. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITH-LONG-NONCE | Ensures the Holder accepts long nonces or produces an error if not supported | This test passes a 384 character nonce in the request object. The authorization server must either successfully authenticate and return the nonce correctly, or if it does not support nonces that long it may return an invalid_request error back to the client or show an error page (saying the server rejects long nonce - upload a screenshot of the error page). The server MUST NOT return the nonce corrupted or truncated. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITH-LONG-STATE | Ensures the Holder accepts long states or produces an error if not supported | This test passes a long state in request object. The authorization server must either return an invalid_request error back to the client, and must show an error page (saying the server rejects long state - upload a screenshot of the error page) or must successfully authenticate and return the state correctly. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITH-MULTIPLE-AUD-SUCCEEDS | Request Objects with multiple aud | This test pass aud value as an array containing good and bad values then server must accept it. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITHOUT-EXP-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder enforces expiration claim in request object | This test is designed to ensure that request objects with missing expiration are rejected by the authorisation server. It should end with the authorisation server rejecting the PAR setup request with an invalid_request_object error |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITHOUT-NONCE-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder enforces nonce to exist within the request object | This test should end with the authorization server showing an error message that the request or request object is invalid (a screenshot of which should be uploaded) or with the user being redirected back to the conformance suite with a correct error response. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITHOUT-REDIRECT-URI-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder enforces redirect_uri to exist within the request object | This test should end with the authorization server rejecting the PAR request because the redirect_uri has not been specified |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-REQUEST-OBJECT-WITHOUT-SCOPE-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder enforces scopes to exist within the request object | This test passes 'scope' only outside the request object. As FAPI-RW requires that all parameters are inside the signed request object, this test should end with the authorization server producing an invalid_request_uri response at the PAR endpoint. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-RESPONSE-MODE-QUERY-PAR | Ensure that a response_mode of query is disallowed | This test includes response_mode=query in the authorization request. The authorization server should reject the PAR request establishment through an OAuth2 error |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-RS256-SIGNING-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder does not accept RS256 signed requests | This test authenticates as normal except that the request object is signed using RS256. RS256 is not permitted by the FAPI-RW specification. The test must end with the authorization server showing an an error message that the request object is invalid (a screenshot of which should be uploaded) or with the user being redirected back to the conformance suite with a correct error response. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-SIGNED-CLIENT-ASSERTION-WITH-RS256-FAILS | Verifies that the use of RS256 for client authentication is disallowed | This test authenticates as normal except that the client assertion passed to the token endpoint when exchanging the authorization code for tokens is signed using RS256. RS256 is not permitted by the FAPI-RW specification. The test must end with the the token endpoint returning an 'invalid_client' error, due to the client authentication being invalid. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-ENSURE-VALID-PKCE-SUCCEEDS | Verify that valid PKCE requests are ignored | This test makes a FAPI authorization request using valid PKCE (RFC7636), which must succeed. FAPI-RW-ID2 does not require servers to support PKCE, but as per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1 'The authorization server MUST ignore unrecognized request parameters' - i.e. whether the server supports PKCE or not, a valid PKCE request must succeed. The reason for this test is that many OpenID Connect clients speculatively use PKCE, and the OAuth2 standard requires that requests from such clients must not fail. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR | Happy Flow Tests (PAR Enabled) | Tests primarily 'happy' flows, using two different OAuth2 clients (and hence authenticating the user twice), and uses different variations on request objects, registered redirect uri (both redirect uris must be pre-registered as shown in the instructions). It also tests that TLS Certificate-Bound access tokens (required by the FAPI-RW spec) are correctly implemented. This version uses Pushed Authorisation Requests to create authorisation objects. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-ATTEMPT-REUSE-REQUEST_URI | Verifies that Request URI cannot be reused | This test tries to use a request_uri twice and expects the authorization server either show an error or redirect back with an invalid_request_uri error, PAR section 7.3 states 'the AS SHOULD make the request URIs one-time use'. If the authentication succeeds a warning will be issued. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-ATTEMPT-TO-USE-EXPIRED-REQUEST | PAR Request expiration verification | This test tries to use a request_uri which has expired and expects authorization server to return an error. The test will call the PAR endpoint to create a new request_uri, then sleep until the expiry time for that request_uri before attempting to use it (this means this test may take some minutes to run, depending on the lifetime of the request_uri). |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-REJECT-AUTHORIZE-AUDIENCE | Verifies that the Holder rejects PAR with setup set to /authorize | This test tries to use the pushed authorization endpoint url as audience in request object, the authorization server is expected to reject the request - depending when the server choices to verify the request object, the refusal may be an error from the pushed request object endpoint, or may be returned from the authorization endpoint. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-REJECT-INVALID-METHOD | Verifies that a Holder rejects PAR requests which use an invalid method | This test tries to use an invalid http method and expects authorization server to return an error |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-REJECT-INVALID-REDIRECT_URI | Verifies that the Holder rejects PAR that specify invalid Redirect URIs | This test tries to provide an invalid redirect_uri and expects authorization server to return an error |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-REJECT-REQUEST_URI-IN-FORM | Verifies that a Holder rejects request_uri form parameters | This test tries to use a request_uri (meant for client1) with client2 and expects authorization server to return an error |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-REJECT-REQUEST_URI-IN-OBJECT | Verifies that a Holder rejects request_uri within the request object | This test sends a random request_uri parameter in authorization request object and expects authorization server to return an error |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-TEST-PAR-AUDIENCE-ASSERTION | Verifies that the Holder accepts a client assertion with a PAR audience | This test tries to use the pushed authorisation endpoint url as audience for Client JWT Assertion, the authorisation server is expected to accept it |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-PAR-TEST-REQUEST_URI-MIXUP | Verifies that a Holder binds PAR generates Request URIβs to Clients | This test tries to use a request_uri (meant for client1) with client2 and expects authorization server to return an error |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-REFRESH-TOKEN | Refresh Token Tests and Binding | This tests obtains refresh tokens and performs various checks, including checking that the refresh token is correctly bound to the client. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-RESPONSE-TYPE-CODE-FAILS-PAR | Ensure the holder enforces the code id_token flow by attempting to use a code only response type | This test uses response_type=code in the authorization request, which (as a JARM response has not been requested) is not permitted in FAPI-RW - only the hybrid flow ('response_type=code id_token') is allowed. The authorization server should show an error message that the response type is unsupported or the request is invalid (a screenshot of which should be uploaded) or the user should be redirected back to the conformance suite with a correct error response, or an error could be returned from the PAR endpoint. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-STATE-ONLY-OUTSIDE-REQUEST-OBJECT-NOT-USED-PAR | Ensure the Holder ignores a state request parameter if it is not within the request object | This test uses a request object that does not contain state, but state is passed in the url parameters to the authorization endpoint (hence state should be ignored, as FAPI-RW says only parameters inside the request object should be used). The expected result is a successful authentication that returns neither state nor s_hash. |
| FAPI-RW-ID2-USER-REJECTS-AUTHENTICATION | User Consent Flow Failure | This test requires the user to reject the authentication, for example by pressing the 'cancel' button on the login screen. It verifies the error is correctly notified back to the relying party. |